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VOTING FOR COMMITTEES IN AGREEABLE SOCIETIES
MATT DAVIS, MICHAEL E. ORRISON, AND FRANCIS EDWARD SU
Abstract. We examine the following voting situation. A committee of k
people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the
committee will submit a list of j candidates that they would prefer to be on the
committee. We assume that j ≤ k ≤ n. For a chosen committee, a given voter
is said to be satisfied by that committee if her submitted list of j candidates
is a subset of that committee. We examine how popular is the most popular
committee. In particular, we show there is always a committee that satisfies
a certain fraction of the voters and examine what characteristics of the voter
data will increase that fraction.
1. Introduction
The goal of this article is to examine the following voting situation: from a pool
of n candidates, a committee of size k is to be formed. Every voter will submit an
unordered list of j candidates that they would prefer be on the committee. We will
assume throughout that j ≤ k < n.
Once this voter data is collected, a committee will be chosen via some procedure.
One way to select a winner of the election is to look for a most “popular” committee:
a committee with the highest proportion of voter “approval”. (In case of ties, there
may be more than one most popular committee.) We must make this notion precise.
Let us say that a voter approves a committee if it contains the list of j candidates
that the voter submitted. Note that a voter may approve several committees, since
several different k-element subsets will contain a given j-element subset if j < k.
We wish to answer questions regarding whether it is always possible, assuming
certain conditions on the voters’ preferences, to find a committee approved by a
certain proportion of voters. Phrased another way, we can ask how popular is a
most popular (most-approved) committee? Can we make any minimal guarantees
for the approval proportion of a most popular committee, given some geometric
condition on the voter preferences?
Such questions have been addressed in voting contexts where each person is
choosing just one candidate. Berg et al. [1] initiated the study of agreeability con-
ditions for voting preferences over a linear political spectrum. In this situation,
candidates are chosen from a line of possibilities, and each person is allowed to
specify an interval of candidates that they find acceptable. In other words, their
approval set is an interval in the real line. They call a society super-agreeable if
every pair of voters has a mutually agreed candidate (i.e., their approval sets over-
lap) and they also consider other agreeability conditions that specify ways in which
voter preferences, when taken in small subsets, are locally similar. They show
how these produce global conclusions about how popular a most popular candidate
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must be, and give minimal guarantees for how many approval sets a most-approved
candidate must lie in.
These ideas have been generalized to other kinds of geometric spaces that can be
viewed as political spectra—circles [10], trees [8], multi-dimensional spaces [5]—as
well as other kinds of approval sets [12] and agreeability conditions [4].
This paper considers similar questions in a new context: voting for committees.
(See [2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14] for several different approaches to the study of voting for
committees.) The set of n candidates is finite, and not viewed as a geometric space.
However, voters are now allowed to specify a list of size j, and there is a geometric
notion of how close two lists may be. The resulting geometric space of lists is called
a Johnson graph J(n, j) where each point is a j-element subset of an n-element set
(see [3] for more on Johnson graphs).
Unlike the context of Berg et al. [1], here the space in which preferences are
expressed is different from the space of potential outcomes of an election, which
are the k-element subsets of the candidates, and which can be thought of in terms
of the graph J(n, k). In particular, each voter’s list in J(n, j) produces an approval
set in J(n, k) consisting of all committees that contain the list. In this paper, we
ask: what is the minimal guarantee for the popularity of a most popular committee
in J(n, k), and if we place conditions on how similar, or “agreeable”, the submitted
lists are in J(n, j), how does that change the guarantee?
We first demonstrate, in Theorem 2.2, a sharp lower bound for any voter distri-
bution. We then show, in Theorem 5.1, that if all the votes lie within a “ball” in
the space of lists, then the bound we can guarantee improves. We conclude with
some extensions and open questions.
2. Definitions
Let us identify the candidates with the elements of the set [n] = {1, 2, . . . n}.
Any j-element subset of [n] will be called a list. (Note that a list here is just a set,
and is unordered.) Any k-element subset of [n] will be called a committee.
We choose to think of given voter data as a probability distribution P on the
set of lists, which we call the voter distribution. In particular, this distribution will
specify for each list ` the voting proportion P (`)—this is the fraction of voters who
submitted the list `. We shall use the same notation to describe the probability of
a collection of lists, so that P (A) describes the likelihood that a voter chose one of
the lists in the collection A.
If C is a committee, let
piP (C) =
∑
`⊆C,|`|=j
P (`)
denote the approval proportion of committee C with respect to voter data P : this
is the fraction of voters that approve a given committee if the voter distribution on
the set of all lists is P . We will write simply pi(C) if P is understood.
Example 2.1. Assume that candidates 1 through 7 are being considered for a 4-
person committee, and voters are asked to submit lists of three candidates. Define
P so that P ({1, 2, 3}) = 7/15, while P (`) = 2/15 for the lists {4, 5, 6}, {4, 5, 7},
{4, 6, 7}, and {5, 6, 7}. (Then P (`) = 0 for all other lists.) For this choice of
P , the list {1, 2, 3} has the highest voting proportion, but by inspection, we see
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that piP ({4, 5, 6, 7}) = 8/15, which is a higher approval proportion than any other
committee.
This example shows that a most popular committee is not necessarily populated
by candidates who are most popular. Even though each of candidates 1 through 3
appears in 7/15 of the submitted lists, and candidates 4 through 7 each appear in
only 6/15 of the submitted lists, the committee {4, 5, 6, 7} is still the most popular.
Our first observation is straightforward; it gives a minimum popularity for a most
popular committee. The proof also illustrates a technique that we will exploit again
later—that a most popular committee has at least as large an approval proportion
than the average approval proportion over all committees.
Theorem 2.2. For any given voter distribution P , there exists a committee Ĉ with
approval proportion satisfying
pi(Ĉ) ≥
(
k
j
)(
n
j
) .
Proof. If we sum the approval proportions over all
(
n
k
)
possible committees for C,
we obtain ∑
C⊆[n],|C|=k
pi(C) =
∑
C⊆[n],|C|=k
 ∑
`⊆C,|`|=j
P (`)

=
(
n− j
k − j
) ∑
`⊆[n],|`|=j
P (`)
=
(
n− j
k − j
)
.
The first equality follows from the definition of the approval proportion. The second
equality follows by noting that each list ` will be satisfied by the
(
n−j
k−j
)
committees
that include ` as a subset; hence the term P (`) will appear
(
n−j
k−j
)
times if we sum
over lists, then committees. And the third equality is a consequence of P being a
probability distribution.
Since there are
(
n
k
)
terms in the sum, at least one committee Ĉ must have
approval proportion pi(Ĉ) at least as large as the average:
pi(Ĉ) ≥
(
n−j
k−j
)(
n
k
) = (n− j)!k!
(k − j)!n! =
(
k
j
)(
n
j
) .

Notice that this bound is the best possible, since it is achieved by, for example,
the uniform distribution on the set of all lists.
3. Votes Within a Ball
We now investigate what characteristics of the voter distribution might improve
the popularity of a most approved committee. For instance, in Theorem 2.2, the
worst possible case is one in which the distribution is “spread out” over all possible
lists uniformly. But if the voters are “agreeable” in some sense then we might be
able to guarantee a committee that will be approved by more voters. As an example,
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{3, 4}
Figure 1. The Johnson graph J(4, 2).
if we knew that all of the voters’ lists were “close”, then this would suggest that
the approval proportion of a most popular committee should be higher than the
bound in Theorem 2.2. How can we can describe the “closeness” of votes?
Consider the Johnson graph J(n, j), whose vertices are the j-sets (i.e., j-element
subsets) of [n], with two j-sets v and w adjacent if they have exactly j−1 elements
in common. In our context, we think of the Johnson graph as the space of possible
lists, with two lists adjacent if they differ by exactly one candidate. Then note that
the graph distance d in J(n, j) has a nice interpretation: for two lists v and w, the
distance d(v, w) = m if and only if |v∩w| = j−m, i.e., v and w differ in exactly m
places. This graph has diameter D = min(j, n− j), which is achieved when j-sets
are as disjoint as possible.
We will explore how to improve the bound in Theorem 2.2 if all the submitted
lists are within some “ball” in the Johnson graph about a central fixed list v. Given
a non-negative integer r, we define the ball of radius r around v to be
Br(v) = {w a vertex of J(n, j) | d(v, w) ≤ r}.
Then Br(v) is the entire Johnson graph if and only if r ≥ D. In what follows,
we assume that j > 1 so that the Johnson graph has diameter at least 2, and
neighborhoods of vertices can be proper subsets of the set of vertices.
Figure 1, though a small example, gives some helpful intuition concerning the
structure of Johnson graphs. We will examine rings of lists in J(n, j) that are
equidistant from v. More formally, define the ring Rr(v) by
Rr(v) = {x ∈ J(n, j) | d(x, v) = r},
for 0 ≤ r ≤ D, which may be thought of as the ring of radius r about the vertex v.
We note that if d(x, v) = r, then the list x must have j − r candidates in common
with the list v, and r candidates different from v. Thus
(3.1) |Rr(v)| =
(
j
j − r
)(
n− j
r
)
.
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For example, in Figure 1, if v = {1, 2}, the rings are:
R0(v) = {{1, 2}},
R1(v) = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}},
R2(v) = {{3, 4}}.
Example 3.1. Let n = 6, k = 4, and j = 3. Theorem 2.2 implies that for any P ,
there will always be a committee Ĉ satisfying pi(Ĉ) ≥ 15 . Now let v = {1, 2, 3}
and assume that P is supported on the ball B1(v), with p = P (v). Then the
complementary probability is
1− p =
∑
w∈R1(v)
P (w) =
6∑
i=4
P ({1, 2, i}) + P ({1, 3, i}) + P ({2, 3, i}).
Hence, since one of the summands must be at least as large as the average,
P ({1, 2, i}) + P ({1, 3, i}) + P ({2, 3, i}) ≥ 1
3
(1− p),
for some i with 4 ≤ i ≤ 6. Then for C = {1, 2, 3, i}, we have
(3.2) piP (C) = P (v) +P ({1, 2, i}) +P ({1, 3, i}) +P ({2, 3, i}) ≥ p+ 1
3
(1− p) ≥ 1
3
.
In fact, if p = 0 and P is distributed uniformly on R1(v), then the inequality in
(3.2) is equality, and 13 is the highest approval proportion for any committee. So in
this case, with the added assumption that P is supported on B1(v), we can improve
the lower bound on piP (Cˆ) to 1/3. (This will also be a consequence of Theorem 5.1
below.)
Rings about a vertex v always follow the same pattern: as r increases from 0 to
D, the rings increase in size monotonically for a time, then decrease monotonically
for a time. In particular, we can show:
Lemma 3.2. |Rr(v)| ≤ |Rr+1(v)| holds if and only if
r ≤ nj − j
2 − 1
n+ 2
.
Proof. A straightforward calculation using (3.1) shows that both conditions are
equivalent to the condition (j − r)(n− j − r) ≥ (r + 1)(r + 1). 
It is helpful to visualize the Johnson graph as points on a sphere, with the list v
at the north pole, and the rings Rr(v) drawn as latitude lines. (This visualization
explains our terminology and captures the behavior of the relative sizes of the rings.)
Suppose the voter distribution P is supported on a neighborhood Bρ(v) of radius
ρ. To find a minimal guaranteed approval proportion, we are interested in the worst-
case scenario – the distribution that leads to a worst possible “best” committee.
Intuitively, we would expect this worst-case scenario to occur when the voters’ lists
are spread out as far away from v as possible, i.e., on the ring Rρ(v). However, if ρ
is too large, the outermost ring Rρ(v) will be too small, and votes on that ring will
be too close together. In that case, the worst-case scenario will result from a more
complicated distribution of voters.
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Example 3.3. Let n = 6, k = 4, and j = 3, and let v = {1, 2, 3}. In Example
3.1, we showed that if the voter distribution P is supported on B1(v), then there
must be a committee C with piP (C) ≥ 1/3. As stated there, if P is in fact the
uniform distribution on R1(v), then every committee C that contains all of v has
piP (C) = 1/3, and 1/3 is the maximum approval proportion in this case. Moreover,
if P (v) > 0, then the discussion in Example 3.1 shows that one of the committees
that contains v will have an approval proportion strictly larger than 1/3. Thus
the “worst-case” scenario occurs only when P is supported on the outermost ring
R1(v).
Conversely, if P were supported on B2(v), then the worst-case scenario cannot
result from P being supported only on R2(v). Because R2(v) = R1({4, 5, 6}), the
previous example shows that at least one committee C would have piP (C) ≥ 1/3 if
P were supported on R2(v). However, if P is the uniform distribution on B2(v),
then it may be checked that the largest approval proportion for any committee
is 4/19. In general, we expect that the worst-case scenario will occur when P is
supported on Rρ(v) only when ρ is small.
4. Concentric Voter Distributions
We begin by showing that the rings, aside from being helpful in visualizing
the neighborhood Bρ(v), are also quite important to our analysis. We define a
concentric distribution centered at v to be a distribution P such that, for any r and
for any two lists `1 and `2 in Rr(v), the proportion of voters choosing `1 and `2 are
the same: P (`1) = P (`2). That is, the votes for lists in a given ring are distributed
uniformly on that ring.
Let wr denote the weight of the ring Rr(v): it is the sum of the voting propor-
tions of elements of the ring Rr(v). Then a concentric distribution is completely
determined by the weights wr, and these weights sum to 1.
Lemma 4.1. For any voting data P , let P ◦ represent the concentric distribution
centered at v that has the same weights as P . Then if C is a committee with the
highest approval proportion piP (C), and C
◦ is a committee with the highest approval
proportion piP◦(C
◦), then
piP (C) ≥ piP◦(C◦).
In other words, uniformizing the voter distribution concentrically over the rings
centered at v can only decrease the popularity of a most popular committee.
Proof. We will treat the weights as fixed for now, and partition the set of committees
into classes by the number of elements a committee differs from the central list v.
We’ll show that the approval proportion piP dominates piP◦ in each class.
Let Cm denote the set of committees that differ from the list v in exactly m
candidates, i.e., m candidates are “missing”. Thus
Cm = {C ⊆ [n] : |C| = k, |C ∩ v| = j −m}.
For instance, C0 consists of all committees that contain the list v.
Note that m ≤ n − k, because any k-person committee in Cm is missing n − k
candidates, including by construction exactly m candidates in v. We also see m ≤ j,
since v has only j candidates. Every committee belongs to exactly one Cm for some
m, and there are
(
j
j−m
)(
n−j
k+m−j
)
committees in Cm.
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Cm vvr
r j − r
r −m
m
k − j +m− r
Figure 2. Committee Cm satisfies list vr, which is distance r from
list v.
We can count the number of committees in Cm that contain a fixed list vr in
the ring Rr(v). A list vr ∈ Rr(v) that is contained in a committee C ∈ Cm can
be visualized as in Figure 2, which is labeled with the sizes of the various subsets
involved. To construct such a committee C, we must choose r −m elements from
the r elements in v \ vr, and k − j + m − r elements from the n − j − r elements
not in v ∪ vr. Thus there are
(
r
r−m
)(
n−j−r
k−j+m−r
)
such committees.
Then consider: ∑
C∈Cm
piP (C) =
∑
C∈Cm
∑
`⊆C,|`|=j
P (`).
Note that P (`) appears multiple times in this sum, once for every instance where
a committee C in Cm contains `. The number of times that happens depends on
what ring ` is in; for ` in Rr(v), the number of committees in Cm that contain ` is(
r
r−m
)(
n−j−r
k−j+m−r
)
as calculated above. So our sum
∑
C∈Cm piP (C) now becomes:∑
C∈Cm
piP (C) =
D∑
r=m
 ∑
`∈Rr(v)
P (`)
( r
r −m
)(
n− j − r
k +m− j − r
)
=
D∑
r=m
wr
(
r
r −m
)(
n− j − r
k +m− j − r
)
,
where wr is the weight of the ring Rr(v). The sum index starts at r = m because
all subsets of Cm by construction must differ from v by at least m elements, and
the index ends at D, the diameter of the graph.
Then at least one of the committees Ĉ ∈ Cm must have approval proportion
equal to or better than average, or in other words,
piP (Ĉ) ≥ 1( j
m
)(
n−j
k+m−j
) D∑
r=m
wr
(
r
r −m
)(
n− j − r
k +m− j − r
)
=
D∑
r=m
wr
r!
(r −m)!
(n− j − r)!
(k +m− j − r)!
(j −m)!
j!
(k +m− j)!
(n− j)! .(4.1)
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Now, consider a similar analysis using concentrically distributed voter data P ◦
centered at v with the same ring weights wr as P . Specifically, we assume that each
list in Rr(v) receives voting proportion
wr(
j
j−r
)(
n−j
r
) .
Then, we note that a committee C◦ in Cm will contain
(
j−m
j−r
)(
k+m−j
r
)
of the lists
in the ring Rr(v). Again referring to Figure 2, we see that a list that is in Rr(v)
must contain j − r elements of v chosen from the j −m such elements in C◦, and
must contain r candidates not in v chosen from the k + m − j such candidates in
C◦.
Thus, if C◦ ∈ Cm, we have
piP◦(C
◦) =
D∑
r=m
wr
(
j−m
j−r
)(
k+m−j
r
)(
j
r
)(
n−j
r
)
=
D∑
r=m
wr
(j −m)!
(r −m)!
(k +m− j)!
(k +m− j − r)!
r!
j!
(n− j − r)!
(n− j)! .(4.2)
So every committee in Cm has the same approval proportion under P ◦. Comparing
the final expressions in (4.1) and (4.2), we see that both are equal to
D∑
r=m
wrbr,m
where
br,m =
r!
(r −m)!
(k +m− j)!
(k +m− j − r)!
(j −m)!
j!
(n− j − r)!
(n− j)! .
Thus
piP (Ĉ) ≥ piP◦(C◦).
That is, the approval proportion of a most popular committee in Cm under P
will equal or exceed the approval proportion of any committee in Cm under P ◦.
Then, taking the maximum over all m, we obtain the desired result. 
The numbers br,m are integral to comparing the number of lists contained in
various committees. Most important are their relative sizes for a fixed value of r.
Lemma 4.2. We have r ≤ j
[
1− j−mk+1
]
(using the notation of Lemma 4.1) if and
only if br,m ≥ br,m+1.
As an example of this, if m = 0 and j is approximately half of k, then we obtain
the condition that r is less than half of j.
Proof. We start with the inequality br,m ≥ br,m+1. After expanding the binomial
coefficients and canceling common terms, we see this is equivalent to
(j −m)(k +m+ 1− j − r) ≥ (r −m)(k +m+ 1− j)
which is equivalent to r ≤ j(k+1+m−j)k+1 , as desired. 
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5. Main Theorem
We are now in a position to prove our main theorem. We now assume that the
voter distribution P is supported in some ball Bρ(v) centered at a list v, with ρ < D
so that Bρ(v) is not the entire Johnson graph.
Theorem 5.1. Let v = {1, 2, . . . j} and consider a voter distribution P supported
on Bρ(v) in the Johnson graph. If ρ ≤ j
[
1− jk+1
]
, then there exists a committee
that satisfies at least
(k−jρ )
(n−jρ )
of the voters.
Proof. Since we are trying to minimize the proportion of voters satisfied by a most
popular committee, Lemma 4.1 shows that we may as well assume the voting dis-
tribution is concentric, which we do from now on. Now, for each m, let Cm be any
committee in Cm. Then the expression given in (4.2) gives the proportion of voters
satisfied by this committee in terms of the wr. The maximum over all m is an
optimal committee for the given profile, so our goal is to minimize that maximum
value. But, under our assumptions, we see that
r ≤ ρ ≤ j
[
1− j
k + 1
]
≤ j(k + 1 +m− j)
k + 1
.
Then Lemma 4.2 shows that br,m ≥ br,m+1. Thus, under our assumptions for
any fixed values of wr, we always have
ρ∑
r=m
wrbr,m ≥
ρ∑
r=m
wrbr,m+1,
since the weights wr are non-negative. Thus we see that Cm is more widely approved
of than Cm+1, and C0 is always a most-approved committee.
Then we have to choose the wr to minimize the value of
∑ρ
r=0 wrbr,0. But
br,0 =
(k − j)!
(k − j − r)!
(n− j − r)!
(n− j)!
=
(k − j)!
(n− j)! · (n− j − r)(n− j − r − 1) . . . (k − j − r + 1).
But there are always n−k terms in (n−j−r)(n−j−r−1) . . . (k−j−r+1), beginning
at n−j−r. Thus, b0,0 ≥ b1,0 ≥ . . ., and the minimum value of pi(C0) =
∑ρ
r=0 wrbr,0
is achieved by letting wρ = 1, and letting every other wr be 0. In this case, the
expression in (4.2) gives the desired lower bound. 
6. Extensions
There are some natural extensions of Theorem 5.1 to other situations that may
be of interest. The first concerns what we can guarantee if only a fraction of the
voters submit votes in a neighborhood Bρ(v).
Corollary 6.1. Let ρ ≤ j
[
1− jk+1
]
. Suppose P is a voter distribution in which
a proportion α of the voters select lists in a ball Bρ(v), e.g., P (Bρ(v)) = α. Then
there exists a committee C with approval proportion
piP (C) ≥
(
k−j
ρ
)(
n−j
ρ
) · α.
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Proof. This follows from applying Theorem 5.1 to just those voters whose votes lie
in Bρ(v). We see there exists a committee that satisfies
(k−jρ )
(n−jρ )
of those voters, which
make up
(k−jρ )
(n−jρ )
· α of the entire set of voters. 
We can also consider slightly more general election procedures. Suppose in choos-
ing a k-member committee from a pool of n candidates, that we allow voters to
submit a smaller unranked list between 1 and j candidates that they would prefer
to have on the committee. If these votes are sufficiently similar to v in a sense that
we make precise below, then we can obtain a result like (and because of) Theorem
5.1.
Corollary 6.2. Consider a distribution of votes over lists of size less than or equal
to j, in such a way that each submitted list is a subset of some list in a ball Bρ(v)
of radius ρ ≤ j
[
1− jk+1
]
in the Johnson graph. Then there exists a committee that
satisfies at least
(k−jρ )
(n−jρ )
of the voters.
Proof. We can convert such a distribution on subsets of size ≤ j into one on j-sets
satisfying the assumptions in Theorem 5.1, in a way that can only decrease the
number of satisfied voters. To see this, consider any voter who submits a list v
containing fewer than j candidates. We replace that list with a list v′ in Bρ(v) that
contains v as a subset. (Note that a voter who submitted v′ would be satisfied by
strictly fewer committees than a voter who submitted the list v.) Then Theorem 5.1
will apply to the resulting voting distribution, and because our alterations might
only have decreased the number of satisfied voters, the lower bound still holds. 
One may also consider elections using thresholds as described in [7], and ask
whether our methods would extend in that context, in which a voter submitting
a list ` approves a committee C if C contains sufficiently many members of `.
Our main result is the special case that each voter only approves committees that
contain all j of the candidates from their list. If voters approve committees that
contain at least s of the candidates from their list, for some s between 0 and j,
then the analogous result to Lemma 4.1 holds and can be proved in a similar way.
However, the analogues of the numbers br,m are significantly more complicated,
making the development of a result similar to Lemma 4.2 a barrier to proving a
generalization of the main theorem.
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